

SECRET

EGNA 7050

EGNA 7050

Chief, EE

Chief of Station, Germany

INFO: Chief, POB

CALL/Operational

British Comments on IS Matters

1. On 21 July the undersigned attended a luncheon given for the newly arrived replacement of [] [], French IS Liaison Officer. In addition to [] and the undersigned, CIC, U.S. Air Force OSI representatives and British Liaison officers [] and [] were present.

2. After a considerable amount of wine had been consumed [] made the statement that he was glad to be leaving Bonn because the Gahlen Organization was going to start running things and both he and his French bosses were aware that the BfV would become an even weaker and more ineffective instrument. [] said they felt the BfV would eventually be abolished and the French were becoming quite alarmed at the manner in which they were being treated and handled by the German Defense Ministry officials. [] said that with the exception of [], no one in the Defense Ministry was available to him anymore and even the French military officials have noticed a coolness on the part of their German counterparts.

3. The above comments by [] acted as a catalyst to get [] and [] started on the subject of U.S./German military relations. They said it was too bad that the U.S. had seen fit to ally herself closer with the Germans on military and intelligence matters than with their allies. [] stated that he and his colleagues had often discussed the problem of German remilitarization and they were convinced that a re-birth of German militarization, whether it be in Western Germany or in a united Germany would in the long run be a more dangerous threat to world peace than the Soviet army. Both [] and [] very bluntly felt that the Americans had sold their souls to the Germans because of their frantic and hysterical desire to thwart the Soviet military strength. They also felt that while it was mainly through U.S. initiative back in 1951 and 1952 that the Germans remilitarized, the time has now been reached where the Germans are rapidly getting the upper hand in these matters.

4. They consistently brought up Zipper and it was quite obvious in talking with them that they felt we had not been truthful with them as to the extent of our past and planned cooperation with this organization. [] already knew that UTILITY had met former American Colonel Truman Smith in Duesseldorf. Both [] and [] pulled my leg somewhat by saying that it wouldn't be long before Zipper defects to G-2 and that it was quite obvious that the U.S. Army was getting very cozy not only with German Defense Ministry officials but were paying increasing attention to German intelligence officials.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY
SECRET

1 COPY

30-6-24-1-1

251

SECRET

5. The British inferred by these statements that they were aware of friction between KUBARK and G-2 and it was apparent that they were watching this alleged feud with great interest. The Britishers and [] both said they regretted very much that during the immediate post-war period the U.S. did not expend more effort in trying to solidify the Allies, namely British and French, in intelligence and military matters. [] very openly stated that there is less cooperation between the British, the Americans and the French than certain Allied cooperation with the Germans. He was apparently referring to U.S. intelligence cooperation with the Germans. He seemed rather bitter and cynical about the subject and finally stated, "we better drop the subject since I might say things I would later be sorry for".

6. In answer to []'s comments that the BfV is becoming an ineffective instrument, [] stated that they had a great deal of confidence and faith in Hubert Schröbers and that he had known him for quite some time. He said Schröbers is young and energetic and would fight to prevent his office from being dominated by "certain outside agencies that your Americans have your fingers in".

7. These comments are being forwarded to help assess what some of our Allies on the working level think about U.S./German cooperation.

Distribution:

3 - EE (DIRECT) ✓
3 - COS
2 - RCB

25 July 1955

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

33-6-2/1-122-1